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Objective: To explore the impact of human factors on intraoperative adverse events and compensation mecha-
nisms in pediatric cardiac surgery.
Methods: Prospective observations of pediatric cardiac surgical procedures were conducted. Patient complexity
scores were calculated and outcomes recorded. The process of care was divided into epochs. Events were ex-
tracted and coded into compensated or uncompensated major and minor adverse events. Linear regression and
analysis of variance were used to analyze the relationships between epochs, complexity, adverse events, and out-
come. Patient-specific and procedure-specific variables were tested in a forward stepwise logistic regression as
predictors of cases with 1 or more major adverse events.
Results:One hundred two patients undergoing pediatric cardiac surgery were observed. An average of 1.2 (range
0–6) major adverse events occurred per case. The most common type of major adverse event was cardiovascular,
and most occurred during the surgery/postbypass epoch. Cognitive compensation was the most common compen-
sation mechanism for major adverse events. An average of 15.3 minor adverse events occurred per case. Minor
adverse events occurred frequently during the surgery/bypass epoch and related to communication and coordina-
tion failures. Higher case complexity, longer surgery duration, and higher number of major adverse events per
patient correlated with death compared with other outcome groups (P<.01). Case complexity (P<.01) and sur-
gery duration (P< .05) were both significant predictors of major adverse events.
Conclusions: Pediatric cardiac surgery is an ideal model to study the coordinated efforts of team members in
a complex organizational structure. Adverse events occurred routinely during pediatric cardiac surgery and
were mostly compensated. Case complexity was a significant predictor of major adverse events. The number
of major adverse events per patient correlated with clinical outcomes.Human factors research on team decision-making in com-
plex task environments is of extreme relevance to surgical
team performance. The operating room environment greatly
affects and shapes surgical outcomes.1-3 Factors that influ-
ence the team’s effectiveness include the performance of in-
dividual team members, the equipment they use, established
care processes and procedures, and the underlying organiza-
tional and cultural factors.4 Recently, action science and eth-
nography methods have been applied in acute care settings
to assess the impact of human factors on patient out-
comes.2,5-7 Pediatric cardiac surgery (PCS) in particular,
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acteristics of complex microsystems.1,8-10 It encompasses
many complex procedures that are dependent on a sophisti-
cated organizational structure, coordinated efforts of multi-
ple individuals, and high levels of cognitive and technical
performance.11 Several factors have been linked to poor out-
comes in PCS, including institution and surgeon-specific
volumes,12,13 complexity of cases,14 and systems failures.5
The primary aim of this study was to explore the impact of
intraoperative human factors and adverse events on surgical
performance and patient outcomes in PCS. A secondary aim
was to look at adverse events compensation mechanisms.
METHODS
The operating room was considered a ‘‘microsystem’’—a small, well-
defined front-line unit providing care for a specific patient population.8 A
pre-study process mapping defined the boundaries of the clinical microsys-
tem that was to be studied.9,10 The process of care was divided into 7 epochs
based on extensive observations and an iterative process (Figure 1): (1) pre-
operative/transport to operating room; (2) anesthesia induction; (3) surgery
before bypass; (4) surgery bypass/repair; (5) surgery after bypass; (6) trans-
port to intensive care unit (ICU); (7) hand off to ICU team.
Two observers performed real-time prospective observations of the PCS
team from the inception of anesthesia to the patient hand-off in the ICU.
Training for the observers included in-depth directed study of cardiac sur-
gery theory and literature, watching videotaped PCS procedures, detailed
discussions on human observational methods, and informal testing (with
E.A.B., P.B., and J.K.J.).15 Full institutional review board approval was at-
tained. Written consent was acquired from all PCS team members, parents,urgery c December 2008
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DAbbreviations and Acronyms
CPB ¼ cardiopulmonary bypass
ICU ¼ intensive care unit
HIPPA ¼ Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act
PCS ¼ pediatric cardiac surgery
or guardians. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
authorization was gained from parents or guardians. Data were de-identified
on the basis of institutional review board IRB requirements and in compli-
ance with HIPAA regulations.
The outcome scores were coded at discharge by a previously published 1
to 4 scale as follows: (1) uncomplicated hospital stay, (2) intubation more
than 72 hours with mild morbidity, (3) prolonged intubation and major mor-
bidity, and (4) death.16 Mortality was defined as any in-patient mortality or as
outpatient mortality within 30 days of surgery.17 Clinical variables collected
for each patient included age, weight, gestational age, sex, admission date,
date of surgery, discharge date, length of stay, status at discharge and 30
days postoperatively, preoperative status such as need for intubation, ino-
tropes, urgency of repair, operating room times, postoperative ventilation
time, extubation date, and need for mechanical support. Clinical case com-
plexity wasmeasured by the comprehensive Aristotle risk assessment scoring
system.14 The scoring tool stratifies on the basis of the potential for morbid-
ity, mortality, and the anticipated technical difficulty of a given procedure.
Patients younger than 18 years were chosen randomly, but an effort was
made to focus on neonates and patients with complex conditions. The sur-
geon wore a video head-camera so that observers could also follow the sur-
gical steps. The observers created a handwritten observational tool to
document the surgical flow. The field notes were transcribed by an indepen-
dent party and later analyzed by the research team. Adverse events were de-
fined as ‘‘unintended incidents in care that may result in adverse outcomes
or may require additional care efforts to prevent adverse outcomes.’’18 The
events were extracted and coded according to immediate patient outcomes.
Adverse events were classified as major or minor events (major event—may
have serious consequences; minor events—not expected to cause serious
consequences or break in surgical flow).16 Events were then further classi-
fied as compensated or uncompensated (compensation—appropriate action
taken to offset the effect of adverse event).
Events were further categorized into each appropriate epoch and subdi-
vided into the following clinical naturalistic categories: (1) blood products;
(2) lines and line placement; (3) instruments (4) monitoring; (5) sterility and
hygiene; (6) cardiopulmonary bypass (CPB); (7) bleeding; (8) ventilation;
(9) technical/surgical issues; (10) communication; (11) medications (12)
transport; (13) cognitive; (14) cardiovascular; and (15) transesophageal
echocardiogram.
The following types of compensation were differentiated: (1) cognitive;
(2) luck; (3) system (4) surgical–technical; and (5) monitoring. ‘‘Luck’’ was
defined as a compensation occurring solely because the compensatory ac-
tion happened to occur at the right time but without any explicit clinician
reasoning. ‘‘System’’ was defined as the policies and procedures already
in place. The videotapes were reviewed when necessary to corroborate ob-
servational data. The data were later analyzed independently by a pediatric
cardiac surgeon and a cardiac anesthesiologist. Patients were followed up
prospectively throughout their hospital course by the observers. All data
were documented in an Excel database.
Statistical Analysis
The data were analyzed for both descriptive and analytic statistics. We
focused on identifying the relationships between the number of events,
types of events, length of the epochs, timing of events with case complexity,The Journal of Thoracic and Caand outcomes. c2 Analyses, analysis of variance, and linear regression
models were used to analyze relationships between length of the epochs,
number of events per case, case complexity, and outcomes. Confidence
intervals were measured when possible.
RESULTS
Demographics
Between September 2003 and January 2005, 431 pediat-
ric cardiac operations were performed at the University of
Chicago Children’s Hospital, and 102 (24%) patients were
observed (735 hours of observation). The mean age was
499 days (range 1 day–15 years). The group included 29
(28%) neonates and 43 infants. CPB was used in 84
(82%) patients. The median Aristotle complexity compre-
hensive score was 12.6 (range 3.5–24.5). A total of 1315 ad-
verse events were noted. The study group had a 30-day and
hospital mortality rate of 3.9% and 6.9% (n ¼ 7), respec-
tively. The mortality rate was higher than that of the entire
operated cohort during the same time period (3.9% vs
2.5%).
Major Events (Table 1)
A median of 1.1 major events (range 0–6) occurred per
case. The majority of events (43%) occurred during the
postbypass epoch, including cardiovascular adverse events
(56%) and bleeding adverse events (62%) (Figure 1). The
most common type of event was related to the cardiovascu-
lar system (20%), followed by an airway or pulmonary
event (14%) (Figure 2). Cognitive compensation was the
most common type of compensation (35%) (Figure 3).
Two major events were uncompensated: a carotid laceration
resulting from attempts at internal jugular line placement
and that left no lasting harm, and a malignant ventricular
tachyarrhythmia that was unresponsive to conservative mea-
sures and eventually required emergency extracorporeal
membrane oxygenator support. The analysis of variance
demonstrated that significantly higher case complexity, lon-
ger surgery time, and higher number of major events per case
were correlated with a death outcome (P< .05).
Minor Events (see Table 1)
A median of 18.3 minor events (range 2–54) occurred per
case, most often during CPB (32%) (Figure 1). In addition,
36% of communication problems and 31% of instrumenta-
tion difficulties also occurred during the CPB period. The
most common type of minor events was communication fail-
ures (29%) (Figure 2). The most common type of compen-
satory mechanisms was system counterdefenses in 47% of
events (Figure 3).
Correlations
The length of the surgical procedure (‘‘surgery epoch’’)
(mean 301 minutes; SD 101 minutes) correlated with case
complexity (r ¼ 0.83; P < .05), whereas neither therdiovascular Surgery c Volume 136, Number 6 1423
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FIGURE 1. The process of care was divided into 7 epochs based on extensive observations and an iterative process.OR, operating room; ICU, intensive care
unit.‘‘anesthesia induction’’ time (mean ¼ 74 minutes; SD ¼ 24
minutes) nor the ‘‘postoperative’’ (mean ¼ 25 minutes;
SD ¼ 11 minutes) epochs correlated with case complexity
by analysis of variance.
Case complexity, longer surgery time, and higher number
of major events per case correlated with outcome 4 (death)
(P< .05). The number of major events per case correlated
with patient outcomes (P< .05) and case complexity (P<
.01).
The duration of surgery and the number of major events
per case increased with case complexity. Case complexity
was not significantly different between patients with type
2 or 3 outcomes (Table 2). Excluding non-CPB cases or us-
ing hospital mortality instead of 30-day mortality did not
change the statistical results or their significance. There
were no significant differences between different outcome
groups in the number of minor events per case.
Predictive Value of the Observation Data
The complexity of the case (odds ratio ¼ 1.29 [1.05–
1.57]; P ¼ .0131) and the surgery duration (odds ratio ¼1424 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular S1.01 [1.00–1.02]; P ¼ .0475) were both significant predic-
tors of major events.
DISCUSSION
The principal findings of this study were as follows:
1. Major and minor adverse events occurred regularly
during PCS.
2. Case complexity and surgery duration were both signifi-
cant predictors of major events.
3. The number of major events correlated with clinical out-
comes.
4. Ninety-eight percent of major adverse events and 90% of
minor events were compensated; however, compensation
mechanisms were found to be more reactive than preven-
tive.
Over the past few years, a plethora of solutions have been
proposed to address the deficiencies in health care delivery.
However, very few of these solutions have been evidence-
based. Subsequently, there has been little impact on reduc-
ing patient harm, and a dearth of knowledge regarding theurgery c December 2008
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studies have demonstrated that the majority of hospital ad-
verse events are related to an invasive or surgical procedure
and occur predominantly during the intraoperative phase of
the procedure.20 Extensive inquests into preventable deaths
after PCS, such as the Manitoba Inquiry21 and the Bristol
Royal Infirmary Inquiry,22 have revealed the influential im-
pact of human factors and system issues on PCS outcomes.
A landmark study by de Leval and colleagues16 investigated
the role of human factors on surgical outcomes in PCS pa-
tients, specifically using the arterial switch operation as an
example of complex, high-risk surgery. The identification
of, and successful recovery from, major and minor adverse
events was observed. The total numbers of minor and major
events per case were both strong predictors of the probability
of death and near miss. They found that, although proper
compensation greatly reduced the risk of death, minor events
go largely unnoticed by the operating room team and are
The distribution of types of major events
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FIGURE 2. The distribution of types of major and minor events.The Journal of Thoracic and Ctherefore left uncompensated.16 A subsequent analysis of
the same data suggested that minor events impede the oper-
ating room team’s ability to compensate for future major
events.9
These findings, and the findings of Catchpole and associ-
ates,1 are entirely consistent with the present study, which
is also heavily weighted toward complex cardiac repairs
(as evidenced by a median Aristotle comprehensive score
of 12.6).14,17 Given the complexity of the repairs selected
by the study, it is not surprising that the majority of major
adverse events (41/92 [44%]) belonged to the cardiovascu-
lar system (cardiovascular, bleeding, surgical–technical,
CPB). Many of the major events were related to organiza-
tional accidents, which followed closely Reason, Carthey,
and de Leval’s model23 of latent elements in a microsystem
predisposing teams to have major adverse events.
The epoch most laden with adverse events was by far the
surgery/postbypass epoch, during which 45% of all major
adverse events occurred. This vulnerable and unstable pe-
riod begins with the aortic crossclamp release and is fol-
lowed by weaning and separation from CPB. This can be
seen as analogous to aviation’s most event-laden periods,
take-off and landing (also called the ‘‘glass cockpit,’’ that
is, all communications not related to takeoff and landing re-
stricted below 10,000 feet).24 These results are also strik-
ingly similar to a comparable study performed in adult
cardiac surgery patients in which the majority of major ad-
verse events occurred either during CPB or during the post-
bypass phase.25 These studies reinforce our understanding
that this epoch is the most distraction-sensitive and human
error–prone period in the intraoperative cardiac surgical pro-
cess. Not surprisingly, the majority of instrument and device
difficulties also occurred during the CPB period.
In contradistinction to the observational studies on the
arterial switch operation, which found a high correlation
between number of minor events and outcomes,16,26 we
did not find a similar effect. This is most likely due to the
fact that we were not studying one specific operation per-
formed at many different hospitals, but rather a variety ofCompensation Types for
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study of a mixture of cases by the same group in London
yielded only a weak relationship between minor events
and outcome further supports the generalizability of our
findings.1 In the present study, most minor events occurred
during the surgery/bypass epoch, followed closely by the
presurgery/anesthesia induction epoch. The most common
type of minor events was communication failures (29%),
36% of which occurred during the CPB period and 26%
during the anesthesia induction. The predominance of com-
munication failures mirrors the findings of the Joint Comis-
sion on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
national sentinel event reporting program27 and also the
findings of two other recent studies.2,4 This suggests an
area in need of improvement, with greater attention paid to
the nuances of communication modes during induction
and CPB times.
Interestingly, we found that minor events were indepen-
dent of case complexity and occurred in all cases. This is
a unique and troubling finding. Minor events seemed to arise
from a different dynamic that occurred in all cases, irrespec-
tive of case complexity, case duration, or seniority of team.
The large number of minor events seems to indicate an envi-
ronment awash with distractions, interruptions, andmiscom-
munications. This again bears a striking resemblance to the
adult cardiac surgery study reported by Wong and col-
leagues.25 The data suggest opportunities for clinical rede-
sign of care as well as opportunities for team training.
Focused team communication training, for example, has
been shown to improve the subjective and objective reliabil-
ity of communication exchanges.28
The compensation mechanisms differed for major and
minor adverse events. For major adverse events, cognitive
and surgical–technical compensation, rather than primary
TABLE 1. Examples of major and minor adverse events
Epoch Major AE (appropriate category in parenthesis) Compensation mechanism
Transport to OR  Inadequate preop with possible harm had case proceeded
(Communication)
 System
Presurgery/anesthesia induction  Accidental extubation while placing TEE probe (TEE)  Cognitive
 Carotid artery stick during internal jugular line placement
with major intrathoracic hematoma (Line placement)
 Uncompensated (noticed after sternotomy
and required repair on CPB)
Surgery/prebypass  Lack of ventilation on partial bypass with alarms
silenced (Ventilation)
 Cognitive
 Aortic laceration during redo sternotomy (Technical/surgical)  Technical
Surgery/bypass  Cap left off O2 tank, resulting in no blood oxygenation for
first 2 minutes of bypass (CPB)
 Cognitive (surgeon noticed dark
deoxygenated blood in arterial limb of
CPB system)
 Pulmonary artery anastomosis stenotic (CV)  Technical (redone)
Surgery/postbypass  Excessive bleeding (Bleeding)  Technical
 Blood products not ready (Blood products)  Luck (because none were needed
despite complex case)
Transport to ICU  O2 tank ran out (Transport)  Monitoring
Epoch Minor AE Compensation mechanism
Transport to OR Wrong patient chart  System
Presurgery/anesthesia induction  Sterility during line placement  Uncompensated
Surgery/prebypass  Equipment problems (electrocautary)  Monitoring
Surgery/bypass  Coordination between surgeon and assistant  Cognitive
Surgery/postbypass  Communication breakdown  System
Transport to ICU  Delay in equipment (bed) availability  Uncompensated
AE, Adverse event; OR, operating room; TEE, transesophageal echocardiogram; CPB, cardiopulmonary bypass; CV, cardiovascular; ICU, intensive care unit.
TABLE 2. Outcome by case complexity, length of surgery, major events, and minor events (mean ± SE)
Outcome N Case complexity Length of surgery (min)
No of major
events per case
No of minor
events per case
1 64 9.9  (0.39) 196.9  (11.39) 0.9  (0.16) 17.4  (1.06)
2 20 13.8  (0.88) 198.9  (19.34) 1.1  (0.25) 20.2  (2.47)
3 11 13.6  (1.00) 184.1  (30.73) 1.3  (0.38) 18.4  (4.42)
4 7 19.5  (1.52) 367.2  (28.12) 2.7  (0.89) 21.1  (6.54)
Higher case complexity, longer surgery time, and more major events per case correlated significantly with outcome 4 (death) as compared to other outcomes (analysis of variance).
There was no significant difference in the number of minor events per case between different outcome groups.1426 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery c December 2008
Barach et al Congenital Heart Disease
C
H
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practices (70% of all compensation). While surgical–techni-
cal compensation is inherent to any surgical procedure, the
prevalence of cognitive compensation (41%) implies that
human factors play an important role in PCS outcomes.
The system compensation mechanism was triggered in
only 10% of cases, and ‘‘luck’’ was the main compensatory
mechanism in 13%. A system that relies heavily on cogni-
tive prevention or on ‘‘luck’’ is inherently unreliable and de-
pendent on external forces, such as surgeon fatigue, personal
issues, and other extraneous factors. Interestingly, minor
events compensatory mechanisms were mostly geared to-
ward system compensation (45% of cases), suggesting
that the systems that have been put in place as barriers
against adverse events are not resilient enough to catch
major adverse events.29
The number of major adverse events per case correlated
significantly with hospital survival despite the fact that vir-
tually all major events were compensated (or deemed to be
acutely compensated by the study group). This would sug-
gest that the compensatory mechanisms may not have
been sufficient in preventing death, since ideally, perfect
compensation would imply complete long-term recovery
from an adverse event. Furthermore, compensation was
most often reactionary in nature and not preventive or proac-
tive, suggesting a definite role for improvement in clinical
processes toward prevention.
Limitations of this Study
We recognize several limitations to the study. There are
limitations to both human factors research and statistical
analysis of performance assessment. The capture of observa-
tional data is by necessity subjective and observer-depen-
dent and can suffer from interrater reliability as well as
a sampling bias.3,15 Undoubtedly, many events, and espe-
cially those occurring behind the anesthetic curtain, might
have been missed. However, identification of major adverse
events remained stable throughout the course of the study,
suggesting that the observers were able to pick up most if
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FIGURE 4. Number of major and minor events over time.The Journal of Thoracic and Canot all major adverse events (Figure 4). We calibrated our
observer carefully, including using two observers early in
the study to observe the same case, and found remarkably
similar findings. On the other hand, the capture of minor
events did go up as the study progressed, suggesting that
the observers became increasingly familiar with the myriad
of potential event enablers and were able to discern more
adequately routine from nonroutine events. Observers
were overseen by participating clinical personnel, possibly
creating an inherent bias. The adverse event domains and
compensation typology were developed on the basis of ex-
tensive clinical experience and in-depth knowledge of the
cognitive psychology of human error and responses. It will
benefit from further validation. The domains overlap, re-
flecting the complexity of the PCS environment. For exam-
ple, a cognitive element is nearly always present even if the
adverse event is strictly technical or monitoring related. In
every case, we have tried to choose the most appropriate
main compensation mechanism, which, although always de-
termined by consensus, remains subjective by definition.
Finally, standardized training and calibration of observers
would improve the data collection. More sophisticated and
objective observational measures could be introduced in
the operating room.30 Technical innovations, such as the re-
mote analysis of surgical environment6 that allow real-time
coding of specific communications and interactions, could
evolve to capture a wider range of operative events. The cre-
ation of a computer tablet–based tool that allows for precise
and fast data recording would undoubtedly facilitate obser-
vations.2 In the future, more sophisticated observation
methods will help detect system vulnerabilities, recognize
suboptimal team performance, and highlight the role of
human factors on patient process and outcomes.
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